The Securitization Epidemic

The Securitisation Epidemic

JAMES TURNER, NOV 30 2013

THIS CONTENT WAS WRITTEN BY A STUDENT AND ASSESSED AS PART OF A UNIVERSITY DEGREE. E-IR PUBLISHES STUDENT ESSAYS & DISSERTATIONS TO ALLOW OUR READERS TO BROADEN THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE WHEN ANSWERING SIMILAR QUESTIONS IN THEIR OWN STUDIES.

The World Health Organisation estimates that there are 34 million people suffering from the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) across the globe, with 1.7 million people dying as a result of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in 2011 (2012). The humanitarian cost of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases has created debate within the discipline of security studies, as some critical scholars argue that disease creates instability within societies that poses a threat to national and international security. More traditional scholars dismiss these claims, only going as far as admitting that disease from the impacts of biological weapons represents a security threat, as they are an attack against a state. However, given that the intentions of biological weapons are to cause damage to the social and economic order of society, and that infectious disease also causes damage to social and economic order, infectious disease constitutes a traditional, as well as a new security threat. It is crucial to define disease, examine securitisation theory, explore the securitisation of disease, analyse the ramifications of biological weapons in security studies, and evaluate the impacts of disease and biological weapons on security in order to understand why disease is a security threat.

Defining disease as a general concept is problematic, given the vast array of disease types. This argument will focus on infectious disease, which the World Health Organisation (WHO) defines as “caused by pathogenic microorganisms, such as bacteria, viruses, parasites or fungi; the diseases can be spread, directly or indirectly, from one person to another” (2013b). Examples of infectious disease include HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and various strains of influenza.

It is also important to define both the political and apolitical dimensions of disease. The political aspect of infectious disease is when it is used as a weapon; that is, when the impacts of a disease on individuals and society are deliberately used to cause damage and harm to gain concessions. The apolitical aspect of infectious disease is when diseases function under normal pathogenesis and spread through a population (Davies 2008: 300).

Another concept that needs to be discussed in order to understand the security dimension of disease is the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory. The Copenhagen School first conceptualised securitisation in the 1990s and attempted to understand how previously benign issues become security threats. There are three steps involved in securitising an issue. The first is an actor declaring an existential threat against their survival or existence, through a ‘speech act.’ Second, the audience of the speech act, generally civil society, accepts that there is a threat working against their survival or existence. Finally, extraordinary action, effort, and allocation of resources are dedicated to combating the new security threat (Lo Yuk-ping, Thomas 2010: 448). Securitisation theory seems to be closely aligned with constructivist views on security, as both stress that security issues are perceived and created through actions, rather than being inevitable parts of the international system (Hampson 2013: 292; McInnes, Rushton 2013: 119).

Securitisation theory has been criticised on several levels; however, concerns about the theory broadening the security agenda are particularly relevant. A common theme amongst sceptics and critics of a broader security agenda is that a broad and all-encompassing definition of security removes the validity and seriousness of security threats. As Deudney notes, “If everything that causes a decline in human well-being is labelled a ‘security’ threat, the term loses any analytical usefulness and becomes a loose synonym for ‘bad’” (Enemark, Selgelid 2008: 459). The theoretical backgrounds of infectious disease and securitisation theory can now be used to analyse the securitisation of disease in constituting a security threat.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) created the term human security in the 1994 Human Development Report where it began to shift the focus of security away from the state, and onto the experiences of individuals and how they feel insecure in their everyday lives (Altman 2003: 419). Coincidently, the UNDP’s human security agenda, which included health security, arose at the same point as the idea that infectious disease, most notably HIV/AIDS, could be a threat to national security, particularly in the United States of America. As early as 1990, the National Intelligence Council described HIV/AIDS as a ‘time bomb’ that would have unmeasurable economic and political consequences (McInnes, Rushton 2013: 124). By the mid to late 1990s, US Secretary of State Colin Powell raised serious concern over the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the Global South for national security in his country, but also for regional security in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Lee, McInnes 2010: 6). It is clear that the USA identified HIV/AIDS, amongst other infectious diseases, as a threat to its survival and integrity. The USA needed to make a speech act in order to begin securitising infectious disease.

The first meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) at the beginning of the millennium in 2000 was dedicated to the issue of HIV/AIDS in Africa. The UNSC was under the Council presidency of the USA at this point, who saw HIV/AIDS as a pressing threat to their security (McInnes, Rushton 2013: 122). In July of 2000, Security Council Resolution 1308 was unanimously passed which noted that HIV/AIDS would be a threat to stability and security if action was not taken to combat the disease (Lee, McInnes 2010: 8). While the unanimous passing of Resolution 1308 shows that the threat of infectious disease was a priority for many countries’ security agendas, there has been debate as to whether the UNSC really considered infectious disease as a genuine threat. Rushton agrees with this idea based on evidence that China, Russia, and France, who are permanent members of the Security Council, were originally hesitant to consider HIV/AIDS as a security threat. However, the other 14 members of the Security Council could not be seen to be complacent about a humanitarian disaster like the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and had to follow the securitisation claims by the USA (2010: 498). Resolution 1308 primarily faced the issue of HIV/AIDS prevalence